We report results from a laboratory experiment that explores the effects of preference communication and leader selection mechanisms in group decision-making. In a setting where all members of a group get the same payoff based on the leader's decision of how much risk to take, we study (1) how group members communicate their preferences to the leader, (2) whether and how the leader incorporates the communicated preferences into his/her decision. We vary the leader selection mechanism as a treatment variable and consider cases where the leader is exogenously appointed or voluntarily self-selects into the position. We find that individuals frequently deviate from their own preferences when they suggest to the leader what to do. We also find that communicated preferences have a significant effect on actual group decisions, and that leaders compromise between their own preferences and the preferences of others. The data also reveal that individual characteristics matter in whether leaders are likely to keep their own preferences or compromise when making group decisions: Women and individuals who are more trusting of others are more likely to manipulate their own preferences when communicating them and more likely to compromise in response to others' preferences as leaders.
Introduction
In many situations, an individual is faced with the task of making a risky decision that will affect the payoffs of a group of people, including herself. Individuals in executive positions in organizations have the authority and responsibility to make risky and consequential decisions on a very frequent basis. In the finance domain, mutual fund managers make investment decisions that are payoff-relevant to a number of people. In a firm, a manager can make risky or safe hiring decisions that ultimately affect the whole department's payoff. In these contexts and many others, leadership involves the authority of decision-making, which in turn brings responsibility for other people's payoffs. In this paper, we use a decision context where all members of a group earn the same payoff, based on a single member's ("leader") choice in a risky decision task, to model decision-making on behalf of a group.
2 The group's interests are ex-post aligned, in the sense that a good outcome is equally good for everyone and a bad outcome is equally bad, but ex-ante group members might have different opinions about what decision is best. Within this context, using two separate experiments, we explore two different dimensions of the institutional structure of group decision-making. The first one is the communication of group members' preferences to the leader, in terms of how preferences are communicated and how they affect the actual group decision. The second one is the mechanism by which the group leader is determined, that is, whether the leader volunteered for the position or was exogenously appointed. In addition, we explore the role of individual characteristics such as gender and level of trust in others, both in how individuals communicate their own preferences to others and how much they take into account others' preferences when making a decision that affects everyone's payoff.
In many contexts where group members have differing preferences as to what the group decision should be, leaders have the option to find out the preferences of, or get suggestions from group members about what to do. This is usually the case in organizations with a hierarchical structure:
for example, at universities deans have the responsibility and authority of making binding decisions that affect the whole college. The organizational culture may be such that the dean collects information about the preferences of faculty members before making the final decision.
In contrast, the decision-making process could be more "autocratic", in that the leader decides without much input from other group members.
3 Even when preferences of other group members are communicated to the leader, the leader can choose whether or not to incorporate it into the decision. In our treatments with communication, we explore the questions of (1) The nature of decisions made in the leadership position can also depend on the mechanism that determines who gets to be the leader in a group, team or organization. Cases where one is exogenously appointed to make binding decisions on behalf of others are not uncommon. An upper-level manager may assign a single employee the responsibility to make project-related decisions on behalf of a team of co-workers or subordinates. For example, a political party may appoint a local representative to coordinate the election campaign for a particular district, choosing between alternative strategies with uncertain outcomes. The government may assign lower-level officers (such as village heads) to be in charge of local decision-making. . In perhaps a less consequential context, an employee could be asked to organize a business event and 3 Autocratic and democratic/participative leadership are in fact two major leadership styles that have been long identified and highlighted in leadership research in psychology (Lewin et al., 1939) .
choose between a risky new venue and a tried-and-true one, with the resulting outcome influencing everyone's payoffs.
An alternative to appointment is self-selection. Especially when there is no hierarchical decisionmaking structure, the leader is usually endogenously determined from among a group, with people who are more willing to take the responsibility being more likely to emerge as decisionmakers. Even when there is a hierarchy as in the examples above, instead of making assignments, the authority may ask group members (co-workers, local party members, villagers, group of employees) to choose someone to be in charge. The simplest one of possible choice mechanisms involves the random choice of a member among those who are willing to be in charge. This process creates a democratic environment where people self-select into leadership.
Self-selection into leadership can affect leadership style and the decisions made on behalf of the group in two ways. First, leadership willingness may be trait-dependent and these traits can also correlate with decisions. In addition, the mechanism that placed the leader into the decisionmaking position may have a direct effect on the leader's choices. In fact, research from psychology and sociology show that the leader's source of authority, dependent on whether the leader is "appointed" or "emergent", may influence the actions of the leader as well as the evaluation of the leader's actions by other members of the group (Read, 1974; Hollander et al., 1977; Hollander, 1992) . In the context of our experiment, the leadership selection mechanism is especially relevant for understanding the response of the leader to other group members' preferences: would a leader who did not choose to be in the leadership position be more or less likely to listen to others? In order to answer these questions, we use treatments that vary the source of leadership. In the treatments with appointed leadership, one group member is exogenously assigned to the leader position, whereas in the treatments with voluntary leadership, individuals are first asked to state whether they are willing to act as leaders, and a fair procedure (random draw) determines the leader from among willing group members. 4 We analyze the effects of preference communication and leadership mechanisms using two different experiments. In a three-person, within-subject design, the first experiment provides suggestive evidence that appointed leaders are more likely to take others' preferences into account when they make group decisions. We also find that when The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant literature. In
Sections 3 and 4 we present the design, procedures and results from the two experiments. Section 5 includes a discussion and concluding remarks.
Literature Review
Group decision-making and the difference between individual and group/team decisions have been important topics of study for economists (see, for example, Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Charness and Sutter, 2012) . Particularly relevant to the current paper is the literature that compares individual vs. group decisions in the context of risk-taking and studies so-called riskyor cautious-shifts in the group context (Shupp and Williams, 2008; Masclet et al., 2009 Sutter (2009) shows that communication to the group decision-maker can affect group decisions significantly, our paper identifies how individual characteristics, the properties of the decision environment and the leader selection mechanism affect the way recommendations are incorporated into the group decision, within a design that elicits the leader's individual preference and enables controlling for preference differences. In addition, we also look at the correlates of the recommendations themselves.
The effect of advice from other players has also been documented in settings such as the ultimatum game (Schotter and Sopher, 2007) , coordination games (Schotter and Sopher, 2003) and trust game (Schotter and Sopher, 2006) . In a more recent paper, Çelen et al. (2010) show that subjects are more willing the follow the advice from other players than copying their choices. Charness et al. (2013) find that the advice becomes effective only when the advice-giver has incentives to convince. Unlike these papers, which study how advice influences others' individual choices, we study the effects of preference communication in a group context with common payoffs and a single decision-maker. Several other papers study how the presence of others affect risk-taking decisions of individuals as well as third parties. Cettolin and Tausch (2015) conduct an experiment where individuals endogenously decide how much risk to share after they make individual choices over lotteries as well as after being exogenously assigned to a lottery. They find significant differences between the endogenous and exogeneous treatments in terms of risk-sharing among high risk-takers and low risk-takers. Rohde and Rohde (2015) experimentally study the behavior of impartial spectators choosing public risks and document the varying levels of aversion to ex-ante and ex-post risks and inequality. Linde and Sonnemans (2012) employ a design where individuals choose between risky options while comparing their payoffs to the fixed payoff of another subject. Observing that they can earn at least as much as the other subject makes the subject less risk-averse in this experiment.
Our focus on alternative leadership mechanisms relates the current paper to a different strand of the literature that studies the behavior of elected and appointed leaders. Drazen and Ozbay (2012) , for example, study the decisions of elected vs. appointed leaders in terms of their decisions in a setup similar to a dictator game. They find that elected leaders more frequently follow a non-selfish policy, which is likely guided by a reciprocity motive to reward their election by vote. The paper closest to the current paper in this literature is Kocher et al. (2012) , who find that elected leaders display a more democratic as opposed to an autocratic leadership style, in terms of following the majority decision of the group. Two immediate points of departure of our paper are that we consider "self-selected" rather than elected leaders, and the leader can observe the individual recommendation of each group member, rather than a single majority decision. Another important difference is in focus--the aforementioned studies implement situations where the leader's other-regarding preferences have an important role, because of either a payoff divergence between the leader and the followers, or a different risk profile faced by the leader. In contrast, our setting involves pure payoff commonality among group members ex-post, thereby shutting down social preference motives or any direct payoff incentives for becoming or refraining from becoming leaders. The absence of election by vote in our setup also prevents a reciprocity motive in leaders' decisions. Our focus, then, is specifically on the effects of leadership mechanism on the propensity of leaders to go with their own idea or others' recommendations in implementing what is best for the group.
Design and Results of Experiment 1

Experimental Design and Procedures
In each round of this experiment, the decision context is based on the risk allocation task of Gneezy and Potters (1997) , whereby subjects decide how to allocate 10 TL between a riskless option and a risky option. 5 While the amount invested in the riskless option is safe, the amount invested in the risky option is doubled with probability p, and lost with probability 1-p. The experiment consists of four different group decision-making treatments that differ in terms of the leader selection mechanism and the availability of preference communication to the leader. In addition, there is an individual decision treatment that serves as a control. For each of these five treatments, three periods are run, with the probability of winning set to 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7. 6 Each subject, then, goes through 15 periods of decision-making, with the order of the treatment configurations randomly determined in each session to neutralize order effects. At the start of every group decision-making period, 3-person groups are randomly (re) drawn, and every group member learns the type of treatment: the probability of winning, whether the 5 At the time of the experiments, 1 TL corresponded to $0.62. 6 Notice that in the original paper by Gneezy and Potters (1997) , the amount invested in the risky option is multiplied by 2.5 with probability ⅓ and is lost with probability ⅔.
leader will be self-selected or appointed, and whether there will be preference communication to the leader. In all group treatments, the decision-making context is such that a single subject makes an allocation decision on behalf of the whole group, composed of three members including herself. Based on the outcome of this decision, all subjects in the same group receive the same payoff.
In periods with appointed leadership, the group decision-maker role is randomly assigned to one of the three group members, whereas in voluntary leadership periods each individual is asked, at the start, whether they would like to be the decision-maker for their group or not. In the latter, if more than one person wants to be the decision-maker, a random draw among those determines the leader. If no one wants to be the decision-maker, one of the three people in the group is selected randomly to make the decision. If the period is a "no communication" period, the leader proceeds to make the group decision. If the period is a "communication" period, before the leader makes her choice, the non-leader group members are individually asked how much they would allocate to the risky option, if they were the group decision-maker. 7 This information is then made available to the leader, but the leader has the option to view or not view it before he/she makes the group choice. This allows us to have more observability and control over how much information is taken into account, and by which types of leaders, since not viewing the information at all is an extreme case of disregarding others' preferences. The leader then makes her choice.
In every group treatment, other group members can observe the leader's decision, but not the outcome. 8 Finally, at the end of any group period, non-leader members communicate their opinion of the implemented decision to the group leader, in binary like-or-dislike messages that are not payoff-relevant and designed to mimic the non-monetary consequences of making good or bad decisions for others. Subjects are aware of this from the start. In each new period, groups are shuffled, the leadership procedure is re-applied, that is, a (potentially) new leader is determined, subjects learn of the treatment type, and then make their decisions according to their roles.
The experiments were conducted at two universities in Turkey, Koc University and TOBB ETU, using undergraduate students as subjects. The experiment was programmed using Z-tree (Fischbacher (2007) ). 10 sessions were run, and we have data from 156 subjects in total: 57 females and 99 males. All subjects were paid a show-up fee of 5 Turkish Liras, in addition to the amount earned in the experiment. Subjects never learned who was in their group. One of the 15 periods was chosen randomly at the end for payment. If an individual task was chosen for payment, subjects were paid on the basis of their own decisions. If a group task was chosen for payment, all three subjects that form a group got the same payoff, based on the decision of the group leader.
Based on this design, our hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Without preference communication, assigned and self-selected leaders make similar choices.
H2: Without preference communication, assigned leaders change their decisions more than selfselected leaders in the group context with respect to the individual context.
H3: In settings where communication is available, individuals communicate their own preference
to the leader exactly, when not in the decision-making role.
H4: Communicated preferences affect leaders' decisions: the riskier the suggestion is, the riskier the actual group decision, controlling for the leader's own preference.
H5: Assigned leaders' decisions are more affected by the communicated preference, when they see the preferences communicated by other group members.
In addition, we set to explore the role of individual characteristics and contextual parameters such as gender and the probability of winning in communicating preferences, group decisions, and willingness to lead.
Results of Experiment 1
We present our results in two main subsections, 3. (Ertac and Gurdal (2012) , Arbak and Villeval (2013)), we also examine whether there are gender differences in leadership willingness.
Our data confirm Ertac and Gurdal (2012) : on average, men are significantly more willing to make the group decision than women, with men volunteering 89.9% of the time and women 76.3% of the time (p<0.01 in a Mann-Whitney test). Table 1 provides summary statistics on the risk taken on behalf of the group, when the leader does not have access to recommendations by other group members. In this setting, self-selected and appointed leaders take similar levels of risk on behalf of the group (Mann Whitney test, pvalue = 0.68), corroborating Hypothesis 1. As expected, the probability of winning uniformly increases the risk taken on behalf of a group, as well as the risk taken individually. An important question in studying group decisions is whether individuals take more, less or similar amounts of risk when deciding on behalf of a group, as compared to how they decide individually. On average, there is no significant difference between the risk taken for a group and for oneself, when individuals receive no recommendation from other group members (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.62). We find that 41.7% make exactly the same decision they make individually, whereas 31.1 % and 27.2% engage in cautious-and risky-shifts, respectively.
Group Decisions without Preference Communication
Regressions (not reported here) of the within-person difference between group risk and the risk taken in the corresponding individual round show that the leader selection mechanism does not make a significant difference in the frequency of cautious vs. risky shifts. However, the leadership mechanism has a crucial effect on the likelihood of leaders to "shift" at all.
The regressions reported in Table 2 show that appointed leaders are 10 percentage points more likely to make a different decision in a group context (Column 1, p-value = 0.064), and the size of the absolute difference from individual decisions is also significantly larger for appointed leaders (Column 2, p-value = 0.009). 10 Note that, these regressions, and the other ones conducted for Experiment 1, control whether a corresponding individual period with the same probability of winning was played or not (the variable Earlier Alone Period). when communicating to the group leader. In particular, we look at the propensity to give the same, higher or lower advice than one's own preference. The first column of Table 3 show that as the probability of winning reaches the highest level, individuals are more likely to just state their own preferences when making suggestions to the leader. Own risk preference being higher increases the likelihood of a cautious deviation (but less so for males), whereas own risk preference being lower increases that of a risky deviation when giving an advice. That is, individuals seem to generally deviate to more moderate choices when communicating preferences, rather than exaggerating their preference so that it will be implemented "correctly" even if the leader takes it partially into account. 
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Group Risk Decisions with Preference Communication
Table 4 provides summary statistics on the overall risk taken by leaders across leadership treatments under the availability of preference information. Noting that communicated preferences are viewed by leaders 85% of the time, we turn to the questions of (1) whether and how strongly this information affects decisions, and (2) whether its effects interact with the leader selection mechanism.
12
11 In unreported regressions, we show that this move towards more moderate choices still holds if we take out the extreme cases where there may not be much room to move to one direction. Since advice responds to the probability of winning in the expected way as well, it seems unlikely that the result is driven by random behavior. 12 In unreported regressions, we find that the likelihood of viewing the advice does not depend on our treatment variables. The first question is whether the two pieces of information/recommendations received from the other group members have a significant impact on the risk taken on behalf of the group. In a regression where we pool all data, we find that the average communicated risk preference indeed has a significant effect on the group risk taken: when the members recommend taking higher risk, actual group decisions are riskier (see Table 5 , Column 1).
Further results emerge when we consider the interaction of preference communication with the leadership selection mechanism. Using separate regressions for the impact of preference information on the decisions of appointed and selected leaders, we find that the average risk recommendation from group members has a significant effect on decisions only when the leader is appointed--that is, self-selected leaders' decisions do not seem to be affected by the communicated preferences of the group members (Table 5 , Columns 2 & 3). These results are robust to using the maximum and/or minimum of the recommendations, instead of the average.
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These findings suggest that communication mechanisms will have a significant impact on implemented decisions in groups only if leadership responsibility is exogenously assigned. 
Design and Results of Experiment 2
The results of the first study provide suggestive evidence that the selection mechanism used in determining leaders can have an effect on the leader's responsiveness to the information about group members' preferences. However, several aspects of the design might be of concern in interpreting the results of this study. In particular, the same subjects go through treatments both where the leader is appointed and where the leader is selected, which might induce spillover effects across different treatments (for example, once an individual is put into the leader role exogenously, he/she may be more willing to decide in later periods). In addition to this, individual preferences of the subjects could be changing across periods as they get recommendations from other group members, and the information collected in the individual decision rounds, which may come earlier or later than the corresponding group round, might not be sufficient to control for individual preferences that dynamically change.
Motivated by these concerns, we design and conduct a second experiment where (i) the mechanism used to determine the group leader is fixed throughout a given session and (ii) information about individual preferences is collected in all periods. In the second study, there are two between-subjects treatments: appointed leaders, and self-selected (voluntary) leaders.
Given that we would like to further explore, based on the first study results, how leaders respond to recommendations by others, all treatments involve communication by the non-leader. In order to more cleanly study how the leader incorporates the other group member's recommendation along with his/her own preference in making a decision, we use a 2-person context rather than 3-person groups.
Experimental Design and Procedures
As mentioned above, the second experiment was run after analyzing the data from the first experiment, with the goal of presenting a cleaner set of results regarding leader selection and the response to others' preferences. While the basic decision context was the same as in Experiment 1 (the Gneezy-Potters task with varying probabilities of winning in each round), there were a few crucial differences.
The experiment lasted for 12 periods and in each period, subjects were randomly matched to form 2-person groups, with changing pairings every period. The main task, which involved allocating a constant sum between a safe and a risky option, was the same as in the first study, except that the amount to be allocated was increased to 15 TL from 10 TL. The probability of the good outcome could be 0.3, 0.5 or 0.7 as in the first study, and each of these values was used for a total of 4 periods, with the order being random across periods.
The order of the tasks was as follows:
-Subjects made an investment decision for themselves in every period.
-With a probability of 0.25, this decision was used to determine the payments in that period. With probability 0.75, this decision did not count and one of the subjects in the group was determined as the group leader to make an investment decision for both members. In treatment "appointed", this person was randomly determined. In treatment "selected", this person was determined using the same mechanism as in the voluntary leadership periods of Experiment 1. That is, each participant expressed whether he/she would like to be the group leader. If both group members said yes and both said no to leadership, the leader was randomly determined. If only one group member wanted to be the leader, that person would be appointed as the leader.
-The person who was not designated as the group leader made a non-binding recommendation to the group leader.
-The leader saw this recommendation and made an investment decision for the group.
-The other subject was informed about the leader's decision, but was not given any feedback regarding the outcome of the draw for the risky option.
At the end of the experiment, one period was randomly selected to determine the payments of the subjects. Subjects were also asked to complete a post-experiment survey that included demographics as well as a question on the propensity to trust others, taken from the World Values Survey. 14 The average earnings were about 24.5 TL. 15 The experiment was conducted at the Bogazici University Economics Laboratory and we had 9 sessions and 142 subjects in total with each session lasting around 40-50 minutes. Subjects were invited by an e-mail that was sent to students who previously indicated an interest in participating economics experiments and they could register online for a given session. No subject participated more than once.
This design allows us to test the following hypotheses:
H1: Assigned and self-selected leaders make similar decisions on behalf of the group.
H2: Individuals communicate their own preference to the leader exactly, when not in the decision-making role.
H3: Communicated preferences affect leaders' decisions: the riskier the suggestion is, the riskier the actual group decision, controlling for the leader's own preference.
14 We hypothesized that trust would be an important individual characteristic in leadership and the response to others' recommendations. 15 At the time of the experiments, 1TL corresponded to $0.33.
H4: Assigned leaders' decisions are more affected by the communicated preference than selfselected leaders. In particular, assigned leaders are more likely to compromise (move towards the suggested choice and away from their own), controlling for the preference difference.
H5: Controlling for the difference between the communicated preference and the leader's own, riskier advice has the same likelihood of being taken into account as more cautious advice.
As in Experiment 1, we also explore the role of individual characteristics and contextual parameters such as gender and the probability of winning in communicating preferences, group decisions, and the willingness to lead.
Results of Experiment 2
We start by noting some observations regarding leadership willingness. In the voluntary leadership treatment, we observe that subjects are willing to make the group decision 85.8% of the time. The corresponding ratios are 94% for male and 75.5% for female subjects. In an unreported logistic regression we find that male subjects are around 17% more likely to be willing to lead the group, controlling for probabilities of winning and period. This result is highly significant and lends support to both what we observed in Experiment 1 and the result reported in Ertac & Gurdal (2012) , indicating a robust gender difference in leadership willingness. In addition, the data reveal that individuals who are less trusting of others are more likely to wish to be the decision-maker for the group.
In Table 6 we provide summary statistics regarding the investment decisions of subjects during the individual rounds and leadership rounds. As in Experiment 1, we do not find a systematic difference between appointed and self-selected leaders in terms of the risk taken on behalf of the group (p=0.6, Mann-Whitney test), in line with H1. This finding holds both when decisions are compared in the aggregate and when they are compared separately across different probabilities of winning. As expected, probability of winning has a positive effect on the amount invested and the investment decisions are similar to those of Experiment 1 in terms of the percentages of the endowment. Compared to their individual decisions for a given round, appointed leaders make a cautious (risky) shift around 16% (25.7%) of the time, whereas they make the same decision during the remaining rounds. The frequencies are very similar for self-selected leaders who make a cautious (risky) shift around 19.9% (24.8%) of the time. 
Communicated Preferences
The design of the second experiment allows us to see whether the subjects deviate from their individually stated preferences when giving advice to the group leader in a dynamically accurate way, by eliciting individual preferences in every round. We find that the advice given to assigned and self-selected leaders do not exhibit a significant difference (p=0.98, Mann-Whitney test) and this is also true when we break up the decisions based on different probabilities. We observe that subjects' advice to the leader and their individual preference are the same around 78.5% of the time when leaders are appointed and 81.1% of the time when leaders are self-selected, indicating that advice to the leader is a highly reliable proxy for the individual preference of the non-leader subject in the group. At the same time, the suggestion to the leader still deviates from the individual preferences in a substantial number of instances. The average absolute difference between advice and individual preference is around 2.82, which is significantly higher than zero (p<0.01, t-test), providing evidence against H2.
A relevant question here is how likely subjects are to give a suggestion that is the same as/lower than/greater than their own preference, which is stated at the beginning of each period. In a series of probit regressions, reported in Table 7 we find that subjects' own risk preference or the mechanism with which the leader is chosen has no effect on the likelihood of giving a suggestion that is equal to the individual preference (column 1). When it comes to the likelihood of giving an advice lower than the individual preference, we find that individual risk preference has a highly significant positive effect (column 2). In addition, we observe just the opposite and a highly significant effect when we examine the likelihood of giving an advice greater than the individual preference (column 3). This corroborates the finding in Experiment 1 that individuals do not simply communicate their own preference to the leader, and tend to move towards a less (more) risky option if they are individually more (less) risk averse. We also document an interesting gender effect: women are about 10 percentage points more likely to change their own preference when making a recommendation to the leader. Individuals who are more trusting of others are also less likely to keep to their own preference when making a recommendation, and are likely to make more cautious recommendations. Notes: Marginal effects from probit regressions reported. Dependent variable: 1 if advice=own risk, 0 otherwise in column 1, 1 if advice>own risk, 0 otherwise in column 2, 1 if advice<own risk, 0 otherwise in column 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Group Decisions and the Response to Communicated Preferences
We first look at the effects of the suggestion of the other group member on the decision the leader makes. In Table 8 , we report results from a set of regression models where the dependent variable is the decision made on behalf of the group. Using the full sample, Column 1 shows that both the received recommendation and the leader's individual preference have a highly significant effect on the group risk decision. There is no difference between assigned and selfselected leaders in terms of the risk they take for the group. In Columns 2 and 3, we separately do the analysis for assigned and self-selected leaders, respectively, and we find that advice has similar effects on the decisions of both types of leaders, in contrast to Experiment 1. That is, results of Experiment 2 do not seem to corroborate H3. Notes: OLS regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
A particular strength of the design in Experiment 2 is that we are able to consider a single communicated preference, which makes it easier to clearly identify its effect on the decision along with the leader's own preference. If we conceptualize the leader's choice as a potential compromise between her own preferences and the preferences of the other individual, then an important object of interest is whether the leader moves toward the suggestion and away from his/her own preference. In table 9, we summarize the leader's response to advice (i.e. leader's choice shift with respect to her own preference), conditional on the relative comparison of the advice and the leader's own preference for that round. The results reveal an expected, though to our knowledge, a previously undocumented pattern. When a leader receives a recommendation that points to higher (lower) investment compared to her own individual preference, she reduces (increases) the amount of risk she takes or keeps it the same while deciding for the group, behaving as if she uses a convex combination of the advice and his individual preference. In order to analyze this result more rigorously by controlling for other variables related to the decision context and studying the role of individual characteristics, we construct a "compromise" variable that takes the value of 1 if the leader shifts his/her choice towards the suggested decision, in cases where the suggested decision is different than what the leader would like to do herself. Table 10 shows the results from probit regressions of the propensity to compromise. Similar to the results in Table 8 , we find no significant difference between the propensities of assigned and selected leaders to compromise (Column 1). Instead, individual characteristics seem to strongly predict the propensity to compromise. Specifically, female leaders are 23 percentage points more likely than males to change their decisions in response to the other person's recommendation, controlling for the distance between their own preference and the recommendation. Individuals who have a high level of trust in others are (an additional) 16 percentage points more likely to compromise. In Column 2, we consider whether the advice being riskier or more cautious with respect to the leader's own preference has an effect on the leader's propensity to compromise.
We find that controlling for their individual preference (Own Risk) and the absolute distance between their preference and the suggested decision (Preference Difference), leaders are more likely to compromise in response to a suggestion to take higher risk (Risky Advice) than their own. This effect becomes insignificant when we control for the probability of winning (Column 3), although the sign of the effect doesn't change. In all models, the effect of the absolute difference between the advice and the leader's own risk has the expected (positive) sign but this effect is insignificant. 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
While Experiment 1 provides evidence that appointed leaders may be more likely to change their own decisions without communication and also respond more to communicated preferences by others, the latter result (that appointed leaders are more responsive to others' preferences) does not hold in Experiment 2. There could be two reasons why appointed and self-selected leaders might behave differently in response to preference communication. First, voluntary leadership might select certain attitudinal characteristics that induce a person to not put much weight on others' preferences. In fact, Ertac and Gurdal (2012b) study the correlation of personality traits with the willingness to be a leader, and find agreeableness to be negatively correlated with leadership willingness. 16 Alternatively, or in addition, the institutional environment may make individuals behave in certain ways. Appointed leaders may feel that since leadership is bestowed upon them in a situation where no group member was ex-ante different in terms of (1) possessing the right of leadership, or (2) having expressed a preference for/against leadership, they have a responsibility to take the preferences of others into account. In contrast, since our setup partially implies delegation of responsibility to the leader by other group members in voluntary rounds (if somebody is a leader in a voluntary round, it is more likely than assigned rounds that others in the group did not wish to be leaders), self-selected leaders may feel more entitled to go with their own preferences when making the group decision. Similar mechanisms might be behind our finding that when the leader acts without knowing the preferences of others, self-selected leaders are less likely to change their individual risk-taking decisions, i.e. are less responsive to the group context.
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The high rate of self-selection in both of our studies (85% in Experiment 1, 86% in Experiment 2) potentially weakens the self-selection channel discussed above, in that the samples that end up making the decision will be more similar, the higher the rate of volunteering for leadership. On the flipside, a high rate of self-selection makes it easier to identify the pure effect of the leader selection mechanism on individuals' behavior if there is such an effect, i.e., to see whether 16 Arbak and Villeval (2011) find a small effect of agreeableness in the same direction in their study on voluntary leadership in public good contributions. 17 Our results are partially in line with Kocher et al. (2009) in that autocratic leadership in response to the team's opinion is positively correlated with a lower likelihood to change one's individual decision in a team context. someone who would be willing to decide, acts differently depending on whether she was exogenously appointed or volunteered first. The reason why we do not find any effect of the leadership selection mechanism in Experiment 2 but in Experiment 1 may be because it is less likely for someone who said yes to the leadership decision to actually become the leader in the three-person than the two-person context. This may amplify the feeling of having been delegated the decision and feeling entitled to go with one's own preferences in the voluntary treatment in three-person groups While the pure (treatment) effect of leadership may be important, our data also reveal some insights about leadership willingness based on individual characteristics. We find that although volunteering rates are in general quite high, women are still less frequently willing to become leaders than men in both experiments, consistently with the prior literature on gender differences. Individuals who trust others are also less willing to take on the leadership role. As we will discuss below, these characteristics also seem to matter for how individuals behave once in the leadership role.
In both experiments, we find that recommendations to the leader do not exactly reflect own preferences. Instead, as own risk tolerance increases, the recommendation becomes more cautious. This suggests that some individuals may not want to impose their own preferences on others even when making recommendations. Results from Experiment 2 also provide evidence in favor of this, by documenting individual characteristics that predict how individuals make recommendations. Specifically, we find that women and individuals who are more trusting of others are less likely to stick to their own preference when making a recommendation to the leader. Individuals who are more trusting of others are also more likely to deviate from their own preference, and shift in a cautious way when making recommendations.
Experiment 2 also highlights that these two individual characteristics (being female and more trusting of others) independently predict whether leaders compromise when they receive a recommendation that is different from their own preference. 18 These results suggest that women will have a more democratic style in terms of incorporating others' preferences when in the leadership role, in addition to being more sensitive to the group context when they are making recommendations to others. This may have implications for assignment of decision-making responsibility in organizations that aim to construct a more democratic environment in teams or groups.
Self-selected leaders in our experiment are determined by a random draw among those who indicate a willingness to decide on behalf of the group. This process might not be fully representative of the way that leaders get to be elected in real-life, but we believe it involves an essential aspect of this process, namely, the assertion for being the leader. While the election of a leader often involves a vote between those who choose to run as candidates, our focus is on leadership in a context with preference differences but no inherent heterogeneity in informational advantages or leadership capacity. A vote in our case would therefore be somewhat unnatural, because the candidates would have no reasonable record for evaluation by others. Moreover, voting might also trigger reciprocal responses which we would like to abstract from in focusing on the integration of others' preferences into the leader's decision. Still, we believe that it would be fruitful to study the effects of recommendations in settings where leaders are chosen on the basis of individual characteristics in further research.
APPENDIX
Instructions (Experiment 1)
Welcome to this study on economic decision-making. The study will last for 15 rounds, and in each round, you will make certain decisions. Your monetary earnings from the study will be based on these decisions, the decisions of others, and on chance. These earnings will be added to the participation fee and will be paid to you in cash, in private at the end of the study. The decisions that you make will be recorded with a participant ID number randomly assigned to you by the computer. Therefore, your decisions will not be linked to your name. If you have any questions throughout the study, please raise your hand.
The Decision Task:
At every round of the study, the decision to be made is to split 10 Turkish Liras into a risky and a riskless option.
What happens to the amount allocated to the risky option depends on whether the "good outcome" or the "bad outcome" occurs. In the case of a good outcome, the amount put in the risky option is multiplied by 2. In the case of a bad outcome, it is lost. The probabilities of the good and bad outcome will change from round to round. In particular, in some rounds the likelihood of the good outcome will be 70% (and that of the bad outcome 30%), in some rounds the likelihood of the good outcome will be 50% (and that of the bad outcome 50%), and in some rounds the likelihood of the good outcome will be 30% (and that of the bad outcome 70%). In every round, the relevant probabilities will be shown to you on your screen, before you make your decision.
Any amounts put into the riskless option stays as it is.
Example:
Suppose that in a round, the likelihood of the good outcome is 50% (and that of the bad outcome 50%). Suppose that one puts 5 TL into the riskless and 5 TL into the risky option. In the case of the good outcome, this person would get 5*2 + 5 = 15 TL. In the case of the bad outcome, this person would get: 0 + 5 = 5 TL.
Individual and Group Decisions
In some rounds, you will make the allocation decision only for yourself, and your decision will determine only your earnings. In some rounds, on the other hand, you will be assigned to a group of 3, with two other participants. In such rounds, one group member will make the decision on behalf of the group, and this decision will be binding for all group members. That is, the earnings of all three participants in the same group will be based on the decision of a single group member. In every group round, the groups will be randomly formed by the computer, and will not stay the same. That is, in each group round, a new set of groups will be formed. You will never know the identities of the participants that you are in a group with.
Selection of the Participant who makes the group decision:
In some of the group rounds, the participant who makes the decision on behalf of the group will be randomly selected by the computer. In this case, one participant in each group will see a statement on his/her screen that reads: "in this round, you will be the one making the decision on behalf of your group". In some other group rounds, you will be asked whether you would like to be the group member making the decision on behalf of the group. In such rounds, if only one group member wanted to be the decisionmaker, that participant will make the group decision. If more than one group member wanted to be the decision-maker, one of the willing members will be randomly selected to be the decision-maker. If none of the group members wanted to be the decision-maker, one group member will be randomly selected to be the decision-maker.
At the end of any group round, the decision that was made by the group decision-maker will be shown to the two other group members. These group members will be asked to state whether they like the decision made by the decision-maker or not, through clicking a like/dislike button. Information about how many of the group members liked or disliked the decision will be shown to the group decision-maker. However, these statements will not have an impact on the implementation of the decision made by the group decision-maker, nor will they have any monetary consequence for any group member.
Communication by Other Group Members:
In some of the group rounds, the group members who are not making the group decision will be asked to state what they would have done, had they been the one deciding on behalf of the group. The group decision-maker will have access to this information, and will be able to observe it at no cost, if he/she likes. In some other group rounds, the decision-maker will decide without access to the preferences of other group members.
Throughout the study, in each round, the rules for that particular round will be displayed on your computer screen. In other words, in each round, you will know:
-The likelihoods of the good and bad outcome for the risky option -Whether that round is an individual decision round or a group decision round.
-(In case it is a group round) Whether the decision-maker will be randomly selected by the computer or will be based on the group members' willingness to be decision-makers -(In case it is a group round) Whether the decision-maker can see information about what other group members would have done, had they been the decision-maker.
As mentioned before, there will be 15 rounds in the study. Your earnings will be determined based on a single round, which will be selected randomly by the computer. All rounds have the same likelihood of being selected. Therefore, it makes sense to pay attention to every round of decision-making.
